The Grandiose Myths of Rationality

Reading Simon Blackburn on Hume and Truth as I was just a couple of weeks ago, I highlighted, that effectively we need clearer understanding of our working definitions of reason and rationality themselves, before we even get to reasonable agreement on any other topics under investigation. I say working definitions, since expecting ultimate once-and-for-all definitive understanding is a stretch too far and we will always encounter contexts when broader and/or narrower definitions are most appropriate.

Or thick and thin definitions, as Julian Baggini says in his introduction to “The Edge of Reason – A Rational Skeptic in an Irrational World“. Hat tip to Nick Spencer for bringing Baggini’s latest to my attention, and highlighting Baggini’s own attention to respecting positions that many of the more scientistic rationalists would dismiss or mock as religious irrationality. Talking past an interlocutor is no dialogue; no value.

Baggini’s position is pretty much my own, being on the side of rational reason for sure, but recognising that it is we therefore who must be most scrupulous in keeping ourselves honest, because:

“If we do not debunk
the grandiose myths of reason
then its enemies will do so
far more destructively.”

“Reason has only been knocked off its pedestal
because it was raised up too high.”

So whilst defending better definition of rational reason we are explicitly starting with the acknowledgment that rationality is beset with its own problematic myths:

[Myth #1]
That rationality is purely objective
and requires no subjective judgement.

[Myth #2]
That [rationality] can and should
take the role of our chief guide.

[Myth #3]
That [rationality] can furnish us with
the fundamental reasons for action.

[Myth #4]
That we can build society
on perfectly rational principles.

Hallelujah, I say.

If the more scientistic rationalist cannot appreciate those myths for what they are, then reading Baggini’s latest is highly recommended. If like me, you have a philosophical bent that already takes these starting points as givens, then we will find and recognise resources to progress the necessary understanding. Recommended either way.

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[Post Note(2017): Conclusion of excellent detailed review by Massimo Pigliucci. And here his glowing summary review at Amazon. Also an excellent review there from Pat Churchland.]

New Scientist – Not Even Wrong?

This week’s New Scientist “Metaphysics Special” has this front cover:

Which carries the headline:

“How Science Answers Philosophy’s Deepest Questions.”

Really?

If they really are metaphysical philosophy questions, deep or otherwise, then they’re not going to be answered by science. That would make them science questions. Sure, some of the tools science shares non-exclusively with other rational disciplines will be useful in addressing them, but will the target audience or casual reader believe the headline or be more generous in their scepticism?

So much more honest to go with the idea that science and philosophy can work to solve mutual metaphysical problems rather than set-up science as the hero on the white charger to answer all our questions.

I already know many a philosopher turned-off by the aggressively over-reaching marketing before even opening a copy to read what may be actually being argued. Which might be a pity:

FEATURES:
Metaphysics special: How do I know I exist?
Metaphysics special: What is consciousness?
Metaphysics special: Why is there something rather than nothing?
Metaphysics special: What is the meaning of life?
Metaphysics special: Where do good and evil come from?
Metaphysics special: Do we have free will?
Metaphysics special: What is reality made of?
Metaphysics special: Is time an illusion?
Metaphysics special: Can we ever know if God exists?

These are are clearly classic questions with a philosophical dimension, in some cases properly metaphysical questions of existence and meaning maybe before they can even be scientific questions. At least the leader article gives us hope:

LEADER:
Metaphysics has much to offer the study of the natural world.
The branch of philosophy known as metaphysics overlaps with modern science and the two can push the boundaries of knowledge together.

That’s the spirit. I’ll write more when I’ve digested more of the content, but why the antagonistic click-bait headline in a journal of science?

“The Science of Man” – Blackburn on Hume and his Critics

Mentioned I was catching up on Hume, reading Simon Blackburn’s contribution to the “How to Read” series. Hume is one of those philosophers – “the greatest British philosopher” – that I’ve absorbed from secondary sources over the last fifteen years, but never bothered to read and research directly until now. In fact similarly, until three encounters in person in the past two years, I had peviously allowed myself to be only vaguely aware of Blackburn. Said I needed to put that right, but it’s taken a while to find the space.

Been reading his “Truth, a Guide for the Perplexed” and finding it excellent and readable in style, even if I have previously absorbed much of the content of the various classic rehearsed arguments on what makes something true – the kinds of truth worth having. A good read and a good resource – organised, as advertised, as a guide. Maybe more later.

How to Read Hume” I’m finding plenty of Humean content new to me, yet again already finding it reinforcing my own philosophical understanding generally. Striking is the Human Nature / Human Understanding angle. Everything from Hume is indeed Natural and Human. Hume the Humanist philosopher.

“Hume’s philosophy was anthropocentric through and through.”

Blackburn’s opening chapter is entitled Science of Man. Plenty of scientists and humanists, particularly those of the more dogmatic scientistic, “new atheist” persuasion are likely to resist that take, but as Blackburn points out, if you’re not prepared to get to grips with Hume’s rhetoric in context, then you’re not going to understand the subtley of his arguments.

“[T]he science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences, so the only solid foundation we can give to this science must be laid on experience and observation.”

So we’re off, unpicking what exactly we might intend by science, experience and observation. And already I’m a fan of Hume’s “Mitigated Scepticism” – only the other night I was having to qualify to a sceptic audience what I meant by my being properly sceptical.

“[E]xcept in trivial matters,
the light of reason proves to be … unreliable.

Reason even undermines itself …
so it is fortunate that nature bypasses it.”

So we must add Reason to Nature, Science, Experience and Observation as terms we are going to need to unpick before we can agree meaningful definitions. If you’re already sure you know that Science is Nature and Reason and that the only Experience and Observation that matters is the kind of objective evidence that science admits, then Blackburn might have trouble selling Hume to you. It will certainly take some effort for you to buy it. And that’s the point.

When you add misunderstanding his critics and misunderstanding that they misunderstood him, why would you bother?

Perhaps because a lot more people are gonna get killed if we don’t take the trouble to understand.

Self-Censorship is Insidious

A Different Kind of Safe Space by Ted Gup – hat tip to tweet from Kenan Malik.

In all the safe-space and free-speech debates I keep pushing the original idea that education was / is a “safe space” within which to push the boundaries, say & do, hear & experience, anything you can where the longer term risks and consequences are minimal. The idea of it ever being a place safe from things you might not find pleasant was a total perversion from the off.

This quote captures it:

“[Non-fiction writing course] is a lesson not only in the power of words, but in democracy, free speech, and responsibility. Words are dangerous, but not as dangerous as efforts to suppress them, be it by government or dean — and certainly not as insidious as self-censorship.”

I’ve said plenty about the non-absolute boundaries to free-speech – they exist in reality despite what many believe – but the word “insidious” captures the self-censorship aspect like a precise mot juste.

Self-censorship is good and necessary, under your own free control, naturally, but you must always consciously understand when you’re doing it for reasons of appropriate tact and strategic timing. Context is everything – and the safe space of education is the place where the gloves can (must) be off most. The danger is when, like political correctness itself, it becomes embedded unconsciously in patterns of dialogue. Insidious is the word.

I See No Reason, is No Reason.

Had to capture this one.

Been drafting a piece on Robert Frost’s quote for some time now:

“Good Fences Make Good Neighbours.

However I have, in fact, used Robert Frost’s quote in so many contexts recently that maybe the actual post is now redundant.

The essence of the Frost quote is that agreed boundaries are valuable, say between science and philosophy or between rationality and religion, but more generally in “agreeing” working definitions for pragmatic modelling reasons. Too often a naive participant one one side or the other will want to insist on a hard and fast dividing line, and/or one that draws line to their maximum apparent advantage.

The Chesterton quote is about wanting to remove a “fence” – or any other institutional structure – because you don’t understand (nor agree) with it’s existence. The point being it must be maintained until the one side understands why the other has it there.  I see no reason, is no reason.

“There exists in such a case a certain institution or law; let us say, for the sake of simplicity, a fence or gate erected across a road. The more modern type of reformer goes gaily up to it and says, “I don’t see the use of this; let us clear it away.” To which the more intelligent type of reformer will do well to answer: “If you don’t see the use of it, I certainly won’t let you clear it away. Go away and think. Then, when you can come back and tell me that you do see the use of it, I may allow you to destroy it.”

Actually very closely related to Dennett’s “hold your definition” and “Rappaport’s rule” too. In constructive debate it is better (more honest) to accept that you may each be using different working definitions (working understandings) of a concept; declare what they are by all means to help the dialogue, but do not attempt to “agree” or “impose” them as definitive – constraining the dialogue – until after the diaogue itself has reached mutually constructive progress. Late-binding definitions. Rappaport’s rule is an extreme variant which says, don’t even raise negative criticisms of your interlocutor’s position (apparent argument, definitions, meanings and understandings) until they are able to thank you for re-stating their own position better that they themselves. Something to aspire to at least.

In fact – objective definitions are fetishised and there are alternatives.

Physics Moves in Mysterious Ways – Carlo Rovelli’s “Seven Brief Lessons”

I’ve been largely offline for a week visiting Florence, and in fact did very little reading whilst I was away. Florence was too fascinating. So, Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s “Black Swan” and “Antifragile and Simon Blackburn’s “Truth” and “Hume remain incomplete and un-reviewed despite enjoying the gist I’d already gleaned from all four. Their styles could hardly be more different. Taleb writes like he tweets, aggressively and bluntly, if a little repetitively. In Blackburn on the other hand I hear his suggestion of Hume’s studied Edinburgh accent in everything he writes.

Rab C. Nesbitt meets Miss Jean Brodie? Tempus fugit however, and I may never now get round to completing those tasks.

Conversely, lying in bed ths morning, I read Carlo Rovelli’s “Seven Brief Lessons on Physics in one sitting. I’ve been a fan, intrigued anyway, by Rovelli for several years, since he seemed to hold enlightened views on where the gaps in the foundations of knowledge really lie. Apart from noting his book had become a surprise “cult” best-seller, I’d not actually read any reviews, so was surprised to find how short and “primary” it is, aimed at the total novice lay-reader, with a limited attention span alluded to several times. A collection of articles from an Italian newspaper Sunday supplement apparently. Everything of his I’d read before has been much more technical and, whilst I might not agree with – or understand in sufficient detail – everything he says, I always feel he is on the right track.

His Seven Brief Lessons itself is an up-to-the-minute potted history of fundamental science. For me very little “new” in any objective sense. The summary of Loop Quantum Gravity (combined with zero mention of string theory, and only passing reference to super-symmetries) (*) did give me actual new knowledge. For anyone having read Gribbin & Charlesworth’s “Cartoon History of Time” and having grown-up with the inspiration of Carl Sagan and Jacob Bronowski to read about the likes of Einstein and Galileo, Bohr and Heisenberg, Gell-Mann and Feymann, and then embark on a life (60 years and counting) of wanting to understand more, then I’m not really Rovelli’s target audience. For me, everything Rovelli writes evokes Sagan (eg: we are stardust, evoking Lucretius and Blake and the hippies) and Bruno (eg: on the unfortunate Bolzmann).

We are stardust.
We are golden.
And we’ve got to get ourselves.
Back to the garden.
(Joni Mitchell – Woodstock)

However, I read Seven Brief Lessons in one sitting, without making any notes, so I will almost certainly go back, re-read and gut it for more jumping-off points of interest. For, despite being 99% “old hat” for me in terms of raw content, and plenty of points of disagreement on what he chooses to say, the brief narrative is full of important messages.

Firstly the relative estimates of what is unknown vs known with any “scientific” certainty about the natural world is huge.

“on the edge of what we know,
in contact with the ocean of the unknown”

Myth (and vision & imagination, neither of which are exclusive to or excluded from science itself) cover far more of the natural world than does science fact. Even leaving aside any debate about whether anything is ultimately unknowable to science, or any definitions of truth and knowledge or science per se, the scientifically unknown may always be shrinking, but always very large. Significantly so if, like Rovelli, you believe humanity has a very short and insignificant life-span on cosmic scales.

I say, we are literally special, as in individuals of a species of a genus.

Time (past, present & future, and even causation itself) really is the weirdest and least understood fundamental concept. Great that the Loop Quantum Gravity model brings it within, rather than beyond, natural science so we have some chance of evolving their understanding.

I can see why Smolin rates Rovelli’s work.

Bringing brief summaries across several schools of physics (and wider topics of psychology and philosophy) it is noticable, and in fact Rovelli warns, that use of language cannot be uniquely defined across all. Not even the word “reality”, with which I wanted to disagree with Rovelli’s use on a couple of occasions. There are boundaries between fields of study for practical management reasons – philosophy and physics to name but two – but these boundaries are “porous”. They are fences and not walls, so to use Robert Frost’s words “good fences make good neighbours”. Good scientists understand the value of their friendly neighbourhood philosophers.

The border is porous.
Myth [and vision and imagination] nourishes science.
Science nourishes myth.

Really noticable is that new theories that got taken-up and thrashed-out in detail by armies of future scientists, were often just ideas. Inspired in the sense that they came to someone – creatively and imaginatively – as a new way to visualise some existing problem, but nevertheless one of an infinity of possible (better) hypotheses. Those new ideas can come from outsiders and appear madness to existing experts in the field. One person’s annoying “autodidact” in their field, may be an experienced expert in another meta-field. Remember those fences. History is written by those that win, and winning is simply being useful for a generation or three.

Seemingly impossible madness we can do anytime, but hindsight takes a while.

In the model I appear to share with Rovelli, the whole natural world is one of continuing interaction and flow of information – even those things we call objects, even the fundamental particles –  and somehwere, somehow, time is about the entropy of information and causation the force driving it. It is also noticable that Rovelli is comfortable using the word God for unknown causes, yet I don’t for a moment believe he believes in any omnipotent supernatural being as a personal causal agent.

Causation moves in mysterious ways.

Fascinating to be reading Rovelli after our week in Florence. The amount of relgious devotional art and reliquaries of bones and artefacts of the saints is absolutely staggering. Shocking in a salutory way. Of course patronage was part of the politics of its times. But that patronage of religious-wealth and power-politics preserved in its buildings and their collections is a history lesson in both art and science as well as the human players. [It’s got me researching where the Medicis crossed paths with the Borgias and Savonarola again.] Wonderful irony that the Galileo museum holds and displays his fingers as preserved religious relics. I have a general downer on the particular Galileo myths – history written for the convenience of the victors and all that – but there can be no doubting that the ceilings of the Medici’s Uffizi record a breathtaking scope of art and science history as well as religion.

The Large Hadron Collider was not built in a day.

To conclude, and the reason I had to write this meta-review right now without having collected any notes and references, Rovelli closes with his take on the “I” of free-will. After earlier chapters rasing the apparent subjectvity of time and the apparent subjective distinction between reality and the known, Rovelli reveals he is essentially a compatibilist like Dennett and myself. My will is real, as is the I of me and my. We’re built of determinist physics, evolved and living, chemistry and biology. It may be a hard problem – impossible even, I suggest – to explain subjective experience in an objective way, but that doesn’t mean it’s not real. Questions like “Could I have done otherwise?” – with hindsight – are meaningless because the true nature of time and causation in the best accepted standard models of physics remain problematic, not because me and my will are unreal.

Carlo Rovelli’s “Seven Brief Lessons on Physics is a great little (80 page) read, even if, it seems, you’re not his target audience; “written for those who know little or nothing about modern science”. The content is brief, but the style is enthusiastic and inspiring.

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[Post Note (*) To be clear, Loop Quantum Gravity is the branch of fundamental physics research that Rovelli is promoting. Rovelli’s later and more challenging “Reality is Not What it Seems” reviewed here. Will say more about other public scientist writers backing other horses. Never forget it’s all a sport – the game of life – which brings me back to Hume. See next post.]

The Modesty Elephant – Values for a Secular Culture.

As “Islamist” issues of every kind rumble on, I have often found myself pointing out that an elephant in the room is “modesty”. It makes me priggish to even mention it. Of course, when cultural taboos are enforced by patriarchal tradition, women come off worst in the more extreme interpretations of how much exposed flesh is considered inappropriate. But it’s not just women and it’s not just concerned with the distraction of sexual attraction. It’s all of us and it’s about bodily functions and personal body care generally.

Whatever the current level of cultural tolerance of exposed flesh, and whatever the state of evolution of cultural norms, it’s always going to be non-zero and it’s always going to be context dependent.

Setting precisely objective enforceable and quantifiable norms as laws and bans is also never going to be the solution to differences, except as temporary and pragmatic political statements. Appropriateness is about values; values shared culturally.

In the case of the Burka / Burkini total cover-up extremes, and the lesser variations on veils and head-scarves, and beyond the specifically Islamic cultural variations, there are:

  • Modesty per se.
  • Patriarchal domination of women’s freedoms.
  • Non-secular signalling – wearing and display of overtly religious symbols in secular contexts generally.
  • As well as the myriad of contextual variations; from lard-arsed chavs and gentlemen of a certain age wearing leggings and cycling shorts in public to olympic competitors in all manner of skimpy and skin-tight costumes. Too much information, about covers it. Conversely, this can’t be the first time I’ve admitted that I find the eyes-only forms of veil can be very alluring – a little information can carry a lot of meaning.

However, too far from “the norm” implies either a specific context or a specific statement being made, even if the statement is only one of careless ignorance. Freedom of expression is not absolute. Freedom of choice is never entirely free of cultural expectations.

The recent French burkini ban enforcement on the beach in Nice shows how easily the law is made an ass by inappropriate bans. Interesting that the meme erupting from that outrage involves many surfing nuns, Victorian bathing costumes and other historical fascist skirt-length-measurers.

Between repression and gay abandon, there is a wide spectrum of freedom and respect. Norms evolve with culture, and culture is not simply religious. In fact many religious taboos and norms are themselves appropriated conservatively from their pre-existing cultural surreoundings. For those lifestyles involving outdoor toil in hot and/or dusty conditions, near-total cover-up is common for both sexes. For women in particular covering up to avoid leathery tanned skin is a fashion motive first, driven by sexual attraction, and class aspirations. Fashions and what makes people attractive change with time and culture, but skin cancer has become a more permanent concern. What was a traditional veil in one culture has evolved into “slip, slap, slop” marketing in another. Most traditions arise from practicalities before dogmatic and extreme adoptions.

I guess this is really just a conversation starter. But the inescapable element for me is that the focus must be on the balance between the cultural acceptance of shared values and the tolerance of difference from the norm. Jurisdictions need boundaries, not for enforcment of formal bans and laws, but for governance of evolving cultural norms. Interventions across borders – between jurisdictions and their cultures – can be driven by basic human rights, but not by a wishful single level-playing field in terms of cultural norms. Even suggesting that some things are “normal” can be a red-rag to the PC-bulls out there. One of the most unsettling displays of “abnormality” I experienced was a pair of Hassidic Jews on a plane – overtly fashioned as such to start with – going through elaborate prayer rituals taking up aisle and exit space, complete with various props. Am I allowed to mention they were overweight, sweaty and smelly too? All I could think was, is it really necessary guys, that you subject us all to this. Does that make me an anti-semite?

For the burkini ban fiasco, the underlying “modesty” and “freedom” motives are massively coloured by the secular political messaging on all sides. Values for a secular culture.

The reason it’s an elephant in the room is not so much because Islamic culture – and secular extremist reaction to it – has got it wrong, but because secular culture hasn’t necessarily got the modesty-freedom balance right anyway. The politically polarised extremes ignore the elephant.

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[Post Note: Modelling with modesty? and June 2017 – Modest fashions.

Post Note : piece from Elizabeth Oldfield on “extreme secularism”.]

[Post Note : Ten year old story in general terms, religious headgear for police officers, but in recent days, Canadian and Scottish forces adopting Hijab option for female officers. Understandable “community policing” incentive, but blurring official secularity of state, and attracting “Sharia police” jibes. See also the later more extreme Niqab / Burka example below!]

[Post Note – and Maajid Nawaz clear as usual on the middle-ground in his piece for The Daily Beast. Recognising the spectrum across the middle-ground means we can stop ignoring the reality of the underlying issues. When we drain the swamp we notice the elephants.]

[Post Note – and Anne-Marie raises one I’ve raised before on this modesty issue, in her case to make a political point against London’s Muslim mayor, but the underlying issue is clear here:

It’s about balance, Anne-Marie.]

[Post Note – and as I said …

…. it’s not all about sexual distraction either.]

[And Matt …

… nails it.]

[And man! I’d forgotten this one:

Gross “sexualisation” of sporting attire.]

[And on the other “accomodating” side of the argument:

As Gina Khan says, who on earth thought that was a good idea?]

Careful With That Razor, Occam

Cutting your own throat with Occam’s (Ockham’s) razor (Summa Logicae, 1323) has been a recurring meme since (before) I started Psybertron. Here a piece by Philip Ball in The Atlantic reinforces that the drive for simplicity can just as well be counter-productive.

Between the infinity of (general) theses that may explain an (individual, set of) phenomenon and the maximum efficiency of economy there are many plausible and potentially better explanations.

“We are to admit no more causes of natural things, than such as are both true and sufficient to explain their appearances.” [restated by Isaac Newton, Principia Mathematica (1687).]

Simplicity is a practical virtue, allowing a clearer view of what’s most important in [an intentionally simplified view of] a phenomenon.

But Occam’s razor is often fetishized and misapplied as a guiding beacon for scientific enquiry. Here the implication is that the simplest theory isn’t just more convenient, but gets [more probably, correctly] closer to how nature really works.

There’s absolutely no reason to believe that.

Fetish. Yes, that’s the language I’ve been using too.